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We axiomatize the collective identity function selecting the agents that are indirectly
designated by all the individuals in the society.
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The ￿rst paper dealing with group identi￿cation was Kasher and Rubin-
stein (1997).1 In a remark, the following method, axiomatized by Dimitrov
et al. (2003), is suggested. In a ￿rst step, the persons who are designated
by all the individuals are members of the group (the "J"s 2). In the next
step, those that are designated by a J become Js themselves and we reiterate
this latter step. When the set of Js cannot grow anymore, we have the ￿nal
identity of the Js. Said di￿erently, those and only those that are indirectly
designated (i.e. through a sequence of designations) by an unanimous J are
Js. One of the interesting features of this method is that all the Js are in-
directly designated by all the others (including non-Js) and themselves as
deserving to be a J. However, it is not always the case that all those that are
indirectly designated as Js by all the others and themselves are Js.
In Houy (2005), we have axiomatized the Collective Identi￿cation Func-
tion allowing the people with the greatest number of indirect designations to
be identi￿ed as Js.3 In this article we axiomatize the Collective Identi￿cation
Function which allows the individuals that are indirectly designated by all
the individuals (including themselves) to be Js. We will call this function
the Indirect Consensus Function.
2 Framework and Theorem
Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of individuals. Let 2N be the set of all
subsets of N. A designation vector for i, Gi ∈ 2N is the subset of individuals
that i designates as deserving to be accepted as group members (a group
member will be called a J). A pro￿le G = (G1,...,Gn) ∈ (2N)n is a n-
tuple of designation vectors, one for each individual in the society. ∀G =
1See the correction by Dimitrov and Sung (2005).
2We keep the letter J for members of the group to stick to the notations used in the
literature but there is no judgement behind it.
3This axiomatization was more appropriate in a voting framework.
1(G1,...,Gn) ∈ (2N)n,∀g ∈ 2N and ∀i ∈ N we de￿ne G + (g,i) = (G0
1,...,G0
n)
as ∀j 6= i,G0
j = Gj and G0
i = g. Then, G + (g,i) is the same pro￿le as G for
all individuals but i who changes his designation for g ∈ 2N.
A collective identity function (CIF) is a function that assigns a designa-
tion vector to any pro￿le, i.e. f is a CIF if and only if f : (2N)n → 2N.
We will say that a CIF f is more welcoming than a CIF g if and only if
∀G ∈ (2N)n,g(G) ⊆ f(G). Let F be a set of CIFs and let f ∈ F, we will say
that f is the most welcoming CIF of F if and only if it is more welcoming
than any other CIF in F.
To designate what is the indirect consensus function (ICF), we need a
few de￿nitions. Let G = (G1,...,Gn) ∈ (2N)n. We will say that i0 indirectly
designates j, (j ∈ ID(i0;G)) if and only if there exists r ∈ N and a sequence
(ik)r
k=1 ∈ Nr, such that ∀k ∈ J0;r − 1K,ik+1 ∈ Gik and j = ir. The indirect
consensus set (IC(G)) is de￿ned as the set of those that are unanimously
indirectly designated, i.e. IC(G) = {i/{j/i ∈ ID(j;G)} = N}. Now we can
de￿ne ICF as the CIF always designating the indirect consensus set as Js.
Definition 1 (Indirect Consensus Function (ICF))
A CIF f is ICF if and only if ∀G ∈ (2N)n, f(G) = IC(G).
We can now give our axioms.
Axiom 2 (Cooptation, Coop)
A CIF f satis￿es Cooptation if and only if ∀G = (G1,...,Gn) ∈ (2N)n,
∀i ∈ N, i ∈ f(G) ⇔ ∃j ∈ N such that j ∈ f(G) and i ∈ Gj.
Axiom 3 (Robustness of the Js, RJ)
A CIF f satis￿es Robustness of the Js if and only if ∀G = (G1,...,Gn) ∈
(2N)n, ∀i ∈ N, ∀g ∈ 2N \ ∅, i ∈ f(G) ⇒ i ∈ f(G + (g,i)).
Axiom 4 (Non Triviality, NT)
A CIF f satis￿es Non Triviality if and only if if there exists G ∈ (2N)n such
that f(G) 6= ∅.
2The ￿rst axiom, Coop, requires that all Js must be themselves coopted by
a J and conversely, the number of designations an individual gets is not big
enough for him to be a J as long as he is not coopted. 4 The second axiom,
RJ, requires that if a J changes his vote without abstaining, then he is still a
J. The NT axioms requires that there can be Js. We can now show that the
ICF is the most welcoming CIF respecting Coop and RJ and that the ICF
is equivalent to the three axioms given above. 5
Proposition 5
ICF is the most welcoming CIF that satis￿es Coop and RJ.
Theorem 6
A CIF satis￿es Coop, RJ, and NT if and only if it is ICF. Moreover, Coop,
RJ and NT are independent.
3 Proofs
3.1 Proof of proposition 5
Lemma 7
Let f satisfy Coop and RJ. Then, i / ∈ ID(i,G0) ⇒ i / ∈ f(G0).
Proof. Imagine G0 such that i / ∈ ID(i,G0) and i ∈ f(G0).
Algorithmic proof: Set k=0. 1) J(Gk) = {j ∈ N \ {i}/i ∈ ID(j,Gk),j ∈
f(Gk),{i} 6= Gk
j}. 2) Consider jk ∈ J(Gk) if J(Gk) 6= ∅, else set K=k and
stop. 3) Gk+1 = Gk + ({i},jk). 4) Set k = k + 1 and go to step 1.
i ∈ f(G0) by assumption. In step 3, by RJ, jk ∈ f(Gk+1) and by Coop,
i ∈ f(Gk) ⇒ i ∈ f(Gk+1). By de￿nition of J(Gk), we have ∀k,| J(Gk) |≤
n − k since is is straightforward to see that ∀k0 > k,jk / ∈ J(Gk0), then this
algorithm has an end. At the end of it, we have, for all j, j / ∈ f(GK) or
4The French Academy is an instance of institution whose members are decided through
cooptation.
5Notice that as a corollary, we can claim that a CIF satisfying Coop and RJ is either
always empty or the ICF.
3GK
j = {i} or i / ∈ ID(j,GK) and we have i ∈ f(GK) which is a contradiction
with Coop.
Lemma 8
If a CIF f satis￿es Coop and RJ then ∀G ∈ (2N)n,f(G) ∈ {∅,IC(G)}.
Proof. Let us have k ∈ IC(G), k / ∈ f(G) and k0 ∈ f(G). By de￿nition of
IC(G), k ∈ ID(k0,G). Then, by de￿nition, ∃ a sequence i0,i1,...,il (possibly
empty in which case k ∈ Gk0) such that i0 ∈ Gk0, i1 ∈ Gi0, ..., il ∈ Gil−1,
k ∈ Gil. Then, by Coop, k0 ∈ f(G) implies that i0 ∈ f(G). Again, by Coop,
i0 ∈ f(G) implies i1 ∈ f(G) and implementing, il ∈ f(G) implies k ∈ f(G)
which is a contradiction.
Let us have k / ∈ IC(G) and k ∈ f(G). Then, necessarily we have ∃k0 ∈
N \ {k} s.t. k / ∈ ID(k0,G) (by lemma 7, k ∈ f(G) ⇒ k ∈ ID(k,G)). De￿ne
G0 = G + ({k0},k). We have k / ∈ ID(k,G0). By lemma 7, k / ∈ f(G0) which
contradicts RJ. 
Following lemma 8, to prove proposition 5, it is enough to check that ICF
satis￿es Coop and RJ.
3.2 Proof of theorem 6
Lemma 9
Let f satisfy Coop and RJ. IC(G) = IC(G0) 6= ∅, f(G) = IC(G), k / ∈ IC(G)
and G0 = G + (A,k) with A 6= ∅ imply that f(G0) = f(G).
Proof. Let us have i ∈ IC(G). Let G00 = G + ({k},i). By RJ, i ∈ f(G00)
and by Coop, k ∈ f(G00). Let G3 = G00 + (A,k). By RJ, k ∈ f(G3) and by
de￿nition i ∈ IC(G3), hence by Coop, i ∈ f(G3). Let G4 = G3 + (Gi,i). By
de￿nition, G4 = G0. By RJ, i ∈ f(G0) and by lemma 8, f(G) = f(G0). 
Imagine G such that f(G) 6= ∅. By NT, this exists. Let i ∈ f(G) and let
G0 = G+(N,i)+(N,1)+...+(N,n). Then, by de￿nition ∀j ∈ N,G0
j = N. By
Coop and RJ implemented at each stage of the construction of G0, f(G0) = N.
4Now, let us consider G00 = {G00
1,...,G00
n} such that IC(G00) = {i1,...,ik} 6= ∅.





r 6⊆ {i1,...,ir} (or else, ik would not be
in IC(G00)). Let us set G3 = G + (G00
i1,i1) + ... + (G00
ik,ik). By Coop and
RJ implemented at each stage of the construction of G3, f(G3) = IC(G00).
Then, by lemma 9, f(G00) = IC(G00) 6= ∅. This with lemma 8 proves the
theorem.
Independence: Let f−NT be de￿ned as ∀G ∈ (2N)n, f−NT(G) = ∅. f−NT
satis￿es Coop and RJ but not NT. Let f−Coop⇒ be de￿ned as ∀G ∈ (2N)n,
f−Coop⇒(G) = N. f−Coop⇒ satis￿es NT, RJ and the "⇐" part of Coop but
not the "⇒" part of Coop. Let f−Coop⇐ be de￿ned as f−Coop⇐(G) = {1}
if 1 ∈ IC(G) and 1 ∈ G1, f−Coop⇐(G) = ∅ if 1 / ∈ IC(G) and 1 ∈ G1,
f−Coop⇐(G) = IC(G) otherwise. f−Coop⇒ satis￿es NT, RJ and the "⇒"
part of Coop but not the "⇐" part of Coop. Let f−RJ be de￿ned as ∀G ∈
(2N)n,f−RJ = {i ∈ /i ∈ ID(i,G)}. f−RJ satis￿es Coop and NT but not RJ.
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